Abstract-The VCG-Kelly mechanism is proposed, which is obtained by composing the communication efficient, onedimensional signaling idea of Kelly with the VCG mechanism, providing efficient allocation for strategic buyers at Nash equilibrium points. It is shown that the revenue to the seller can be maximized or minimized using a particular one-dimensional family of surrogate valuation functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N THIS PAPER, we address the mechanism design problem, which specifies the rules for allocation and payment, for resource allocation in a network with a single network operator and multiple strategic buyers. The network operator, without knowing the valuation functions of the buyers, aims to select an outcome that is efficient, i.e. maximizes the sum of buyers' valuations.
Kelly and his colleagues [1, 2] showed that, under the fundamental assumption that all the buyers are price-takers, the optimization problem can be solved in a decentralized way. We call their method the Kelly mechanism. Johari and Tsitsiklis [3] showed that, for strategic buyers using the Kelly mechanism on each of the links, the sum of valuations at the equilibrium point is no less than 75% of the efficient value. We give two examples which show the undesirable performance of the Kelly mechanism for strategic buyers when each buyer presents a single bid for a path, rather than bids for individual links.
The celebrated Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism [4] [5] [6] is such that true reporting of valuation functions is a dominant strategy equilibrium, but in the context of divisible goods, such as communication rates, the valuation functions are infinite dimensional, and so have prohibitive communication requirements. In [7, 8] , efficient mechanisms with onedimensional bids are proposed for a single link.
We introduce a mechanism with one dimensional bids for resource allocation in a network in which efficiency is achieved at Nash equilibrium points (NEPs). We call the mechanism the VCG-Kelly mechanism. Although buyers do not have dominant strategies under the VCG-Kelly mechanism (in contrast to the VCG mechanism), their bids are onedimensional. Simultaneously and independently of our work, Johari and Tsitsiklis [9] developed a family of VCG-like mechanisms using simple scaler bids per player. Their work is more general than ours here, in that their framework involves a convex constraint set and is not limited to network resource allocation settings. However, in the more limited setting of our paper, under a regularity assumption, we find that the payoff function of a buyer is a quasiconcave function of the buyer's bid, that all NEPs are efficient, that the NEP is unique if the efficient allocation is unique, and we characterize the range of possible payments. Semret [10] proposed an efficient allocation mechanism in which each buyer submits a two dimensional bid, one dimension for unit price, and the other for maximum quantity. Recently, other work using two dimensional bids appeared: [11, 12] . The mechanism of [12] can be viewed as an instance of the VCG-Kelly mechanism, but for two-parameter surrogate functions. The recent paper of Ausubel [13] describes an allocation mechanism which is a generalization of ascending price auctions, which can provide efficient allocation using one dimensional bids for the allocation problem we address, but the payments are computed by integrating over price trajectories.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the network model, the Kelly mechanism, with either price-taking or strategic buyers (including our two examples), and the VCG mechanism. Section III introduces the VCG-Kelly mechanism and presents the results about it mentioned above. Section IV discusses future work, and proofs are given in the appendix.
II. SYSTEM MODELS
Consider a network with a finite set of buyers, R, and a finite set of links, J. The buyers are in one-to-one correspondence with paths, where a path has an associated set of links. We write j ∈ r if link j is in the path of buyer r. The pathlink incidence matrix A is defined by A jr = 1 if j ∈ r, and A jr = 0 otherwise. We refer to buyers in gender neutral terms, because in the context of communication networks, they are typically computer processes.
The buyers have elastic demands and the valuation function of a buyer r is represented by U r (x r ), which is an increasing, concave, and continuously differentiable function of its rate allocation, x r , over R + . In this paper we assume that the valuation functions of the buyers are in monetary units, so that if buyer r makes a payment of m r for rate x r , the buyer's payoff has the quasilinear form U (x r ) − m r . The links have fixed capacities C j for all j ∈ J.
A. System Problem and Efficient Allocations
A rate allocation vector x x x = (x r : r ∈ R) is called efficient 1 if it is the solution to the system problem:
where
The system problem is a convex optimization problem with linear constraints, so for any solution x x x * there is an associated vector µ µ µ * of Lagrange multipliers satisfying the following optimality conditions:
Throughout the paper, X * denotes the set of all efficient allocation vectors.
B. Kelly Mechanism
Kelly and his colleagues [1, 2] proposed a decentralized method for solving the system optimization problem. In this section, we briefly describe their method from the mechanism design viewpoint.
In the Kelly mechanism, the communication between any buyer r and the network consists of a one-dimensional bid w r given by buyer r to the network, and a price 2 p r given by the network to buyer r. From the bid w r of buyer r, the network constructs a surrogate valuation function w r log x r . The network determines the allocation and payment by maximizing the sum of the surrogate valuations:
Kelly mechanism allocation rule (A, C C C):
The optimization problem associated with this allocation rule is called the network problem in [2] . To ensure that the mapping is well defined, we require that x K r (w w w) = 0 if w r = 0. The solution x x x K (w w w) can be characterized as follows. It is the vector x x x ∈ X C C C which, together with an associated vector µ µ µ of Lagrange multipliers, satisfies the following conditions.
An alternative definition of efficiency, which accounts for the payments of the buyers, is commented on in Section III-B. 2 In the paper, price always represents "price-per-unit".
Prices p p p Figure 1 depicts the Kelly mechanism. The feedback arrow is not a part of the payment and allocation rules of the mechanism, but is shown to indicate that the equilibrium bid of each buyer depends on the bids of the other buyers. Next, we discuss two scenarios: the Kelly mechanism applied to price-taking buyers (as in [1, 2] ) and the Kelly mechanism applied to strategic buyers.
1) Price-taking buyers:
A price-taking buyer r sees p r as a fixed price set by the network and it tries to solve the problem of maximizing the payoff function
which is called the user problem in [2] . It is shown in [2] that, if x x x * and µ µ µ * satisfy (2) and (3), then for bids w r = x * r j∈r µ * j and prices p * r = j∈r µ * j , the following is true: x x x * solves the system problem, and for each r, w r solves the user problem. Thus, the solution to the system problem yields solutions to the user and network problems. The system problem is decomposed into a network problem, which does not involve the valuation functions, and the user problems, which do not involve the network topology.
2) Strategic buyers: A strategic buyer r takes into account how its price is influenced by its bid, w r . This induces a game among the buyers, with the payoff for buyer r given by
Next, in two examples, we show that if buyers using the Kelly mechanism are strategic, NEPs may not exist, and if an NEP does exist, the ratio between the sum of valuations at the NEP to the maximum possible sum (the efficiency ratio) can be arbitrarily 0 and rate x l = C l − x 0 to each single link buyer, where x 0 is selected to minimize the sum of the surrogate valuations:
Example 1: Suppose L = 2, and
It can be shown that all NEPs are in W , and there exists a bid vectorw w w in W satisfying the first order necessary condition for an NEP. Letx x x = (x 0 , C 1 −x 0 , C 2 −x 0 ) be the corresponding rate allocation. The value ofx 0 for all suchw w w's is uniquely defined by
If the three curves
and
do not all meet at a single point, then the value ofw w w is also unique.
Consider the case
There is no triple intersection,w w w = (2, 0, 2) is the unique bid vector satisfying the first order necessary condition, and its associated rate vector isx x x = (4, 1, 4).
However, Π 2 (w 0 ,w 1 , 0) = 3 > Π 2 (w 0 ,w 1 ,w 2 ) = 2 so that w w w is not an NEP. Also because the point satisfying the first order necessary condition is unique, we conclude that there is no NEP in this example. Intuitively, in this specific case, C 1 is close tox 0 , so that buyer 2 does not lose much capacity by decreasing its bid from 2 to 0. Figure 3 shows the payoff function Π 2 (w 0 ,w 1 , w 2 ) as a function of w 2 . Note that it is not concave, which helps explain the lack of an NEP.
Example 2: Thus, the sum of valuations for the NEP is (γ 2 +L)/(γ+1) and the resulting efficiency ratio for L ≥ γ is (γ 2 +L)/(L(γ +1)). As L → ∞ the efficiency ratio converges to 1/(γ + 1). Also, taking γ to be an integer and L = γ 2 yields the efficiency ratio 2/(1 + γ). The ratio converges to zero as γ → ∞. Thus, the loss of efficiency at the NEP can be made arbitrarily close to 100% by selecting γ to be a large enough integer, and L = γ 2 .
C. VCG mechanism
The VCG mechanism, defined as follows, takes reported valuation functions, W r (·), r ∈ R, as inputs.
VCG mechanism allocation rule (A, C C C):
VCG mechanism payment rule (A, C C C):
The payment of buyer r in the VCG mechanism is other buyers' maximum surplus with buyer r not present minus the other buyers' surplus with buyer r present. The payoff of buyer r is
The last term in (9) does not depend on x r . If buyer r reports truthfully, i.e. W r ≡ U r , then, by (7), the seller seeks a choice of x x x that maximizes the sum of the first two terms of the buyer's payoff. Hence, truth reporting is an optimal strategy for buyer r, no matter what the other buyers report. All the buyers reporting their true valuations is an NEP for the VCG mechanism, which implies the allocation derived at the NEP of the VCG mechanism is efficient. 
III. THE VCG-KELLY MECHANISM
We propose a new mechanism defined as follows: the buyers send one-dimensional bids and the mechanism forms surrogate valuation functions as in the Kelly mechanism, and then the VCG mechanism is applied to the surrogate valuation functions. We name the mechanism the VCG-Kelly mechanism because it combines the ideas of the VCG mechanism and the Kelly mechanism. See Figure 4 .
We introduce a generalization beyond log functions, so that the surrogate functions are V r (w r , x r ) = w r f r (x r ) for r ∈ R, where the f r 's are strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice differentiable with f r (0+) = +∞ and f r (x) < 0 over R + . We allow f r (0) = −∞, with the convention that V r (0, 0) = 0. One family of functions from which to select the f r 's is
which is introduced in [15] . The VCG-Kelly mechanism is then defined as follows.
VCG-Kelly mechanism allocation rule (V V V , A,C C C):
x x x VCGK (w w w) = arg max
VCG-Kelly mechanism payment rule (V V V , A,C C C):
The rules (11) and (12) are the same as (7) and (8) 
A. Efficiency of NEPs for the VCG-Kelly mechanism
The following assumption ensures that each buyer is faced with competition on each link of its path.
Special Buyers Assumption For each link j there are at least two single-link buyers using the link, with valuation functions satisfying U (0+) = +∞. Such buyers are called special. Special buyers participating in the VCG-Kelly mechanism always submit strictly positive bids.
If the special buyers assumption does not hold, there can be many NEPs induced by the VCG-Kelly mechanism that are not efficient. However, instead of using the VCG-Kelly mechanism, one can use an -relaxation of the VCG-Kelly mechanism, obtained by introducing two fictitious buyers per link, with valuation functions of the form log(x). As → ∞, the payments of the fictitious buyers converge to zero. These issues are explored further in [8] in the case of a single link.
Next we consider the characterizations of efficient allocations and the VCG-Kelly allocation rule under the special buyers assumption. The special buyers assumption insures that all links are saturated for the efficient allocation, so that the optimality conditions (2) and (3) can be simplified. Under the special buyers assumption, x x x * ∈ X C is a solution to the system problem (efficient) if and only if there is an associated vector µ µ µ * with nonnegative coordinates, so that
Consider a fixed link j. Let r denote one of the special onelink buyers using that link. Then U j (x * r ) = µ j . Thus, although there can be multiple distinct efficient allocation vectors x x x * , for each choice of x x x * , the corresponding vector µ µ µ * is uniquely determined. Moreover, under the special buyers assumption and the assumption that the valuation functions of the buyers are continuously differentiable, the dual problem is strictly convex, so that µ µ µ * does not depend on the choice of x x x * . Let λ * r = j∈r µ * j for each r ∈ R, or in vector form,
r is the price paid by buyer r for the Kelly mechanism with price-taking buyers (denoted by p r in Section II-B.)
We denote the set of special buyers by R s , and the space of admissible bid vectors by W = {w ∈ R R + : w r > 0 ∀ r ∈ R s }. Under the special buyers assumption, all links are saturated by x x x VCGK (w w w) for any w w w ∈ W . Therefore, x x x VCGK (w w w) is characterized by the following conditions. For some vector µ µ µ, with nonnegative coordinates,
The same observations made for the efficient allocation vectors imply that the choice of µ µ µ in (18) (w w w) , and the payoff function Π r (w r , w w w −r ), is strictly quasiconcave in w r .
Let W NE denote the set of all NEPs for the game, with strategy space W and payoff functions given by (13) , induced by the VCG-Kelly mechanism. Our main theorem on the existence and efficiency of NEPs is the following.
Proposition 3.2: Suppose the special buyers assumption holds. The restriction of the mapping x x x VCGK to W NE is a bijection from W NE to X * . In particular, NEPs exist and correspond to efficient allocations, and if the efficient allocation is unique (for example, if the true valuation functions U r are strictly concave), then the NEP is unique.
B. Prices and revenue under the VCG-Kelly mechanism
There is considerable flexibility in choosing a VCG-Kelly mechanism, because of the wide range of possible choices of the functions f s , s ∈ R, used to define the surrogate valuation functions. For a given NEP, λ * r represents the marginal price for buyer r under the VCG-Kelly mechanism at an NEP, for any choice of the surrogate valuation functions. In contrast, the prices (not the marginal prices), depend heavily on the choice of the surrogate valuation functions. Fix an efficient allocation vector x x x * , and consider a buyer r with x * r > 0. There is a unique NEP w w w NE with allocation x x x * , and the price paid by buyer r at that NEP is defined by p . If the function f r for each buyer r is taken to be φ (α) , then the total revenue converges to zero as α → +∞, and to j∈J µ * j C j as α → 0. We remark that an alternative definition of efficiency in the context of mechanism design is to find an allocation and payment rule so that, at the NEP, the sum of the payoff functions of the buyers is maximized. That is, such definition includes the payments of the buyers. Proposition 3.3 shows that the VCG-Kelly mechanism, using functions f s of the form φ (α) , is asymptotically efficient in this alternative sense, in the limit as α → ∞, because the allocation maximizes the sum of the valuation functions, while the sum of payments converges to zero.
IV. FUTURE WORK
Future work includes exploring the space of surrogate valuation functions further, investigation of dynamics for arriving at NEPs, application to other contexts, and implementation issues, such as interaction with existing network protocols, such as TCP.
APPENDIX
The proofs of the propositions in this paper, including lemmas, are given in this appendix.
Lemma 1.1: The mapping x x x VCGK : W → X C C C is continuous. Proof: Suppose w w w (n) → w w w as n → ∞, such that w w w (n) ∈ W for all n and w w w ∈ W. Let x x x (n) = x x x VCGK (w w w (n) ) for each n. It must be shown that x x x (n) → x x x VCGK (w w w). Since X C C C is compact, we assume x x x (n) → x x x for some x x x ∈ X C C C , and then it suffices to show that x x x = x x x VCGK (w w w). Let Φ denote the function on W ×X C C C defined by Φ(w w w, x x x) = r∈R V r (w r , x r ). Let x x x ∈ X C C C and > 0 be arbitrary. By perturbing x x x slightly, we can obtain x x x ∈ X C C C , that has strictly positive coordinates, and satisfies Φ(w w w, x x x) ≤ Φ(w w w, x x x ) + . We have
where the last inequality is a consequence of the fact that Φ is upper semicontinuous. Since is arbitrary, if follows that Φ(w w w, x x x) ≤ Φ(w w w, x x x). Since x x x ∈ X C C C is arbitrary, it follows that x x x = x x x VCGK (w w w), which completes the proof of the lemma. Lemma 1.2: Let I be any subset of R which includes the special buyers. Then for w r ≡ 0 for r ∈ W − I, both x x x VCGK (w w w) and µ µ µ VCGK (w w w) are continuously differentiable functions of (w r : r ∈ I) over the set (0, +∞) I . Proof: The proof is given for the special case I = R, which is sufficient, because buyers in R − I can be ignored. The optimality conditions (17)-(19) can be written as F (x x x VCGK , µ µ µ VCGK , w w w) = 0, where
The function F is continuously differentiable and
Obviously, D is positive definite. For any J-dimensional vector α = 0 0 0, A T α = 0 0 0 because A has full rank (because of the special buyers assumption). Then,
T is positive definite. Thus, the matrix Q defined by Q = (AD −1 A T ) −1 exists and is also positive definite. It is then straightforward to check that the matrix on the right hand side of (20) is nonsingular, and its inverse is:
Therefore, by the implicit function theorem [16] Proof:
Let e e e r = (0, · · · , 1, · · · , 0) T be the elementary vector with r-th entry 1. Then, the r-th diagonal entry of A T QA satisfies e e e 
